

STUDENT RESEARCH PAPER


THIS PAPER IS AN INDIVIDUAL EFFORT ON THE PART OF A STUDENT AT THE US ARMY WAR COLLEGE. IT IS FURNISHED WITHOUT COMMENT BY THE COLLEGE FOR SUCH BENEFIT TO THE USER AS MAY ACCRUE.

8 April 1966

AN OPERATIONAL MODEL FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING -- SOUTH ASIA 1966-70

By

IVAN A. REITZ
Colonel, Civil Affairs



REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED
EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE COMMANDANT, US ARMY WAR COLLEGE.

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

AWC LOG #

66-4-163 U

Copy No. 3 of 8 Copies



DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER

Information for the Defense Community

DTIC[®] has determined on

| | | |
|-------|-----|------|
| Month | Day | Year |
| 04 | 17 | 2009 |

 that this Technical Document has the Distribution Statement checked below. The current distribution for this document can be found in the DTIC[®] Technical Report Database.

- ☒ **DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A.** Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
- ☐ **© COPYRIGHTED.** U.S. Government or Federal Rights License. All other rights and uses except those permitted by copyright law are reserved by the copyright owner.
- ☐ **DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT B.** Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only. Other requests for this document shall be referred to controlling office.
- ☐ **DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT C.** Distribution authorized to U.S. Government Agencies and their contractors. Other requests for this document shall be referred to controlling office.
- ☐ **DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT D.** Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense and U.S. DoD contractors only. Other requests shall be referred to controlling office.
- ☐ **DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT E.** Distribution authorized to DoD Components only. Other requests shall be referred to controlling office.
- ☐ **DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT F.** Further dissemination only as directed by controlling office or higher DoD authority.
- Distribution Statement F is also used when a document does not contain a distribution statement and no distribution statement can be determined.*
- ☐ **DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT X.** Distribution authorized to U.S. Government Agencies and private individuals or enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoDD 5230.25.

U. S. Army Military History Institute

USAWC RESEARCH ELEMENT
(Research Paper)

An Operational Model for Civil Affairs Planning--
South Asia 1966-70

by

Col Ivan A. Reitz
Civil Affairs

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
8 April 1966

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | Page |
|--|------|
| SUMMARY. | iii |
| CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| 2. FORCES AND TRENDS. | 4 |
| India. | 4 |
| Pakistan | 10 |
| Afghanistan. | 13 |
| Nepal. | 17 |
| Sikkim | 19 |
| Bhutan | 20 |
| Ceylon | 22 |
| 3. ROLES OF THE MAJOR POWERS IN SOUTH ASIA. | 25 |
| The role of the US | 25 |
| The role of the USSR | 28 |
| The role of the People's Republic of China | 29 |
| The role of Great Britain. | 31 |
| 4. CONTINGENCIES IN SOUTH ASIA 1966-70. | 34 |
| General war. | 35 |
| Limited war. | 36 |
| Cold war | 37 |
| 5. CIVIL AFFAIRS MISSIONS AND ROLES | 41 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 45 |

SUMMARY

The imagination of any civil affairs unit commander is taxed upon receiving the mission of studying a particular area or country of the world. His principal difficulty is in discerning what steps are necessary to identify the present and future civil affairs missions and roles in that particular area or country, and then identify the specific unit and individual training requirements. This is to assure that his training program is established to meet the most realistic training requirements. It is the writer's purpose to provide an operational model which may be used to illustrate the necessary steps of analyses to identify civil affairs missions and roles in an assigned area or country anywhere in the world. This approach presupposes that an initial area or country study has been completed by the unit.

The subcontinent of South Asia is used as the locale of this operational model and the analyses are based on a digest of an area study previously prepared by the 354th CA Area Hq B, USAR, Washington, D. C., July 1965.

The analyses in this operational model are initiated by reviewing the forces and trends in each of the seven countries of South Asia by identifying significant problems. The next step is to review the posture of South Asia as it relates to the major powers or nations of the world. The strategy, objectives and policies of the US, USSR, PRC and Great Britain toward South Asia are reviewed to determine the relative posture of South Asia.

Deductions are made from these analyses to identify the most probable contingencies in South Asia in which possible US involvement may be required. From these contingencies the probable US Army civil affairs missions and roles are drawn.

The major areas of training interest and missions planning concluded by this training model are: (1) There is no requirement for civil affairs missions of civil defense, command support, area support, or military government in South Asia 1966-70; (2) Requirements do exist for civil affairs contingency planning during this period on a continuous basis for short-, mid-, and long-range planning; and (3) Civic action planning and programming is another major role for civil affairs during this period and represents untapped and unlimited potential for the US Army and its nation building mission.

This operational model accomplished a strategic appraisal of South Asia to identify US military involvement in South Asia for the next five years. From the possible military involvement US Army civil affairs missions and roles may be identified. From the results

of these analyses, a civil affairs unit commander can readily determine his unit and individual training requirements for South Asia 1966-70. In addition the unit commander has provided himself with an effective means of measuring the adequacy of the initial area study and has provided the basis for issuing command guidelines for revision of the area study.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The subcontinent of South Asia historically has been of world strategic importance because it has a commanding position over one of the world's great sea lanes and finds itself as the fulcrum of communications between the Mediterranean and the South China Sea. The land area of South Asia includes 1,980,000 square miles and is approximately half the size of the United States.¹ It is separated from the People's Republic of China (PRC) by the high wall of the Himalayan Mountains. To the southeast lie the countries of South Asia and the searing and escalating conflict in South Vietnam. Farther south, is the troubled country of Indonesia, a historic enemy of South Asia with a temporarily allayed threat. To the north lies the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) with its worldwide ambitions for Communist domination. To the west South Asia looks to the Middle East as a trembling powder keg threatening to explode, and southwest to the continent of Africa where the tide of visceral expectations is bubbling with the turbulence of an active volcano.

The subcontinent of South Asia contains large amounts of untapped vital raw materials and minerals and has the industrial potential of becoming the leader of Asia as well as one of the leaders in the world.

¹354th Civil Affairs Area Hq B, Draft Area Study--South Asia, p. 1.

The reservoir of human resources includes one-fifth of the world's population, greater than Latin America and Africa combined. For the purpose of this paper, the subcontinent will consist of the countries of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Ceylon.

The Moslem-Hindu socio-religious traditions, nationalism and the British legacy are the three most powerful historical and molding forces which probably will continue to shape the destiny of South Asia.

South Asia finds itself as an arena of security considerations for major world powers.² Through the democratic process, India is striving to become the leader of Asia, and at the same time the PRC, through communism, is striving to become the leader of Asia and the world.

Although each nation of South Asia is different in and of itself, and thus requires individual review, they do have a few common attitudes. For the most part, each nation has been neutral or nonaligned in her foreign relations, except for Pakistan. These nations also find themselves in complete agreement in being against colonialism in any form. They also have common characteristics of illiteracy, agricultural economies, low per capita income, widespread poverty, lack of communications and transportation, and many other facets of underdeveloped nations.

²Seymour Topping, "Moscow to Peking: We're Asians Too," New York Times, 16 Jan. 1966, p. E-3.

This paper will accomplish a strategic analysis of the sub-continent of South Asia to identify contingencies which may occur during the next five year period in General War, Limited War and Cold War environments. Possible US Army military involvement will be identified and from the results of these analyses civil affairs missions and roles will be determined.

The purpose of this research paper is to provide an operational model for a civil affairs unit commander in studying and analyzing a particular area or country of the world. This model may be used to illustrate the necessary steps of analyses to identify civil affairs missions and roles in an assigned area or country anywhere in the world. This approach presupposes that an initial area or country study has been completed by the civil affairs unit concerned.

The analyses in this operational model are initiated by reviewing the forces and trends in each of the seven countries of South Asia by identifying significant problems. The next step is to review the posture of South Asia as it relates to the major powers or nations of the world. The strategy, objectives and policies of the US, USSR, PRC and Great Britain toward South Asia are reviewed to determine the relative posture of South Asia.

Deductions are made from these analyses to identify the most probable contingencies in South Asia in which possible US involvement may be required. From these contingencies the probable US Army civil affairs missions and roles are drawn.

The research of this paper was concluded as of the 18th of February 1966.

CHAPTER 2

FORCES AND TRENDS

INDIA

India, the largest nation of South Asia, is faced with forces and trends which are equally as large as its size. The greatest internal problem she faces is an exploding population of over 480 million and the shortage of food, with the constant threat of famine.¹ There are other significant problems of religion, language, inflation, high taxes, unemployment, social structure, high illiteracy rate and low per capita income, all of which are a serious challenge to national stability.²

The major problems confronting the US in India are both economic and military in nature. India will provide symbolic leadership to other underdeveloped countries if she is able to solve her economic problems through a democratic process. Recognizing the staggering problems of India, success could ease the problems of the West and solidify a bulwark of democracy in the face of the PRC threat. The population is increasing at a rapid pace and has devoured whatever economic advancement has been realized to date.³ The population is living on a substandard scale and is faced with the spectre of famine

¹"India," The World Book Yearbook 1965, pp. 367-368.

²354th Civil Affairs Area Hq B, Draft Area Study--South Asia, pp. 4-20.

³Carl T. Rowan, "India's Famine and the Challenge to US," Sunday Star (Washington), 20 Feb. 1966, p. C-4.

that will recur with sickening regularity unless great progress is realized in its economy.⁴

In the face of seemingly insurmountable problems, India has substantial elements of strength. It has untouched natural resources which will support a sound industrial base and agricultural production can be increased considerably by improved farming methods.⁵ The government has strength in that it has a relatively highly-trained civil service, police forces and a working democracy.

India is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations and of the Sterling Area and has close ties with Great Britain. These ties, of course, are further strengthened by the historical relationship of Great Britain and India. Great Britain has provided both substantial economic and military assistance to India. Although West Germany actually has provided more foreign aid to India than Great Britain, this has not placed West Germany in any position of influence with India.

The Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan erupted into a three-week war in September 1965. As a result, the preoccupation of the present and the future is the Kashmir argument which has been boiling since 1947.⁶ The basic reasons for this continuing conflict between India and Pakistan are religious strife, political rivalry,

⁴Warren Unna, "Draught-Seared India Near Famine," Washington Post, 5 Dec. 1965, p. E-1.

⁵"India," The World Book Encyclopedia, Vol. 9, p. 93.

⁶Armed Forces Information and Education, DOD, "India and Pakistan: Crisis in South Asia," For Commanders--This Changing World, Vol. 5, 1 Oct. 1965, p. 1.

economic competition and mutual fear. The USSR was successful in achieving the first step in the reduction of tension over the Kashmir dispute at the Tashkent meeting.⁷

During the course of the war between these two countries and the post-combat period of tension, the US maintained a policy of neutrality and wholehearted support of the UN efforts to bring about a cease fire. The US was deeply concerned about the continued conflict between India and Pakistan and its larger threat to the peace of the Free World. At the same time, the US, as a friend of both nations, acted to reduce the capability of both countries to engage in a long war by suspending military and economic aid to the combatants.⁸

Although Soviet and American interests in Asia are by no means identical, Soviet policy in the Indo-Pakistan dispute paralleled that of the US in seeking an end to a conflict that could bring chaos to the Asian subcontinent and a possible great power confrontation with the PRC. In the past, the USSR has supported India against Pakistan and the Kashmir issue, but in the present situation, the USSR took a neutral stand and offered to mediate the dispute between India and Pakistan.⁹ The USSR contributed significantly to peace in South Asia by bringing the leaders of quarreling India and Pakistan

⁷"Big War in Asia," U. S. News & World Report, 20 Sep. 1965, pp. 37-39.

⁸"What Kashmir War Means to US," U. S. News & World Report, 20 Sep. 1965, p. 41.

⁹For Commanders, op. cit., pp. 1-4.

together on Soviet soil and getting them to sign an accord which calls upon them to remove their troops from each other's territory.

India and Pakistan threatened to plunge the 600 million people of the subcontinent into disaster by stumbling into a war in which neither side had the capability to win. The balance of world peace was even more gravely threatened when the PRC sensed an opportunity to damage Russian and US influence simultaneously by extending its authority south of the Himalayas. India had approximately a million men under arms, compared to the Pakistan 230,000-man army. In view of the comparative manpower resources of both countries, the war between Pakistan and India was analagous to the conflict between David and Goliath.¹⁰

An even more immediate danger was brought into focus. Both countries recall with horror the bloody carnage which followed partition in 1947. It was a period when over a half million Moslems and Hindus were slaughtered in violent religious riots. There are still ten million Hindus in Pakistan and 50 million Moslems living in India. If communal violence broke out again, the resulting carnage might well make battlefront casualties pale by comparison.¹¹

Between Sikkim and Bhutan lies the Chumbi Valley in which China has stationed large combat units. The mere fact that there remains the continuing threat of a Chinese invasion works to Pakistan's advantage by keeping six Indian divisions tied down near the Pakistan

¹⁰"Big War in Asia," op. cit., pp. 37-39.

¹¹Ibid.

border and along the Himalayan frontier. The Chinese readily could attempt a link-up with East Pakistan by thrusting out of the Chumbi Valley to amputate India's rich state of Assam and the entire North-east Frontier Agency.¹²

Indian leaders have not, and do not, currently see Russian communism as a threat to India or to the rest of the world. As a result, relations between India and the USSR have been and are open and friendly. Russia in general is in close competition with the West in assisting in India's economic development. To this end, Russia has provided India substantial economic and military aid. By supporting India when the PRC made its attack in 1962, Russia endeared herself to India. India still follows a completely independent course despite the existing friendly relations. The major interest of Russia has been to prevent the PRC from undermining Soviet prestige in Asia. Perhaps it was for this reason that the USSR accepted the role of arbitrator between two non-Communist countries.¹³

The fear on the part of Pakistan and India has been mutual. Both countries have been contesting for power since they were granted their independence in 1947. One fear has been that Pakistan would try to seize Kashmir and other parts of Indian-claimed territory. At the same time, Pakistan was apprehensive that India would swallow Kashmir. Pakistan has been equally convinced that India is always ready to re-absorb East and West Pakistan, which many Indian Nationalists regard

¹²Ibid., p. 40.

¹³Ibid.

as India's "lost territories."

After India recognized Communist China in 1949, relations were friendly and cordial resulting in the exchange of high-ranking visitors and Indian support for seating the PRC in the United Nations. The Communist Chinese attack of India in 1962 ended this cordial relationship and today India recognizes the PRC as an enemy and an imminent threat. With the consideration that a basic objective of any country's foreign policy must be to defend its borders, India now must continually strengthen her defense forces with the dark spectre of the PRC atop the Tibetan plateau. The buffer state of Tibet has been removed by the PRC and, conversely, it is visualized that the PRC will continue its efforts to make Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan additional buffers against India.¹⁴ Always hostile to India, Pakistan has developed a meaningful rapprochement with China. Even to the south, Ceylon now seems better disposed to Red China, who has combined military incursions with diplomatic enticements in an attempt to isolate India from her immediate neighbors. India's concern over the Red Chinese threat has been heightened by broadcasts from Radio Lhasa and Radio Peking claiming that Bhutan, Sikkim, Ladakh, Nepal and the North East Frontier Agency were the "five fingers" of the Chinese hand, which China has vowed to liberate.¹⁵

Nepal's increasingly close ties with China concerns India because, geographically, Nepal's neutrality is considered vital to

¹⁴Carl D. Howard, "The Jabbing Goes on Between India and China," The National Observer, 27 Sep. 1965.

¹⁵George N. Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi, p. 290.

India. The late Pandit Nehru reminded the Indian Parliament as long ago as 1950 that the Himalayas, which have been India's traditional strategic barrier, are on the northern boundary of Nepal.

Avoiding any reference to various proposals cited for collective security in Asia, the late Prime Minister Shastri said:

Chinese expansionism undoubtedly poses a continuing danger not only to India, but to other countries in Southeast Asia as well. Chinese aggressive policy against India has a special significance, we feel, because India is the largest democracy in the world and is planning for progress through democratic institutions. India is an unbearable example to the Chinese, and their overvaulting ambitions can be thwarted only by a strong and stable India.¹⁶

PAKISTAN

The forces and trends affecting Pakistan are many and varied. Her economy is underdeveloped and the rapid population growth has been offsetting economic gains. The required increases in agricultural production have been impeded by the inefficient utilization of land. While agricultural conditions differ considerably in West vs. East Pakistan, certain basic problems are common to both, such as population density, small subsistence farms, primitive agricultural practices, a 90% rate of illiteracy, recurrent floods and poor control of water resources.¹⁷

Pakistan's human resources of 103,000,000 to support expanded

¹⁶Selig S. Harrison, "Shastri Insists India Will Hold Kashmir," Washington Post, 23 Nov. 1965, p. A-24.

¹⁷354th Civil Affairs Area Hq B, op. cit., pp. P-1-3.

production are adequate only in numbers. The population is largely unskilled and the vast majority are underfed and physically weakened by high incidence of disease. Improved health standards as well as greater educational opportunities must be developed before Pakistan will have the trained and physically capable labor market to support increased production.¹⁸

Pakistan is ruled by a benevolent military dictatorship with tremendous powers concentrated in the hands of the President. The army is the country's major military strength and India is considered to be the principal external threat to Pakistan.

Pakistan is located in the northern portion of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. The two portions of Pakistan, West and East, are separated in the shortest direct line by 920 miles of Indian territory. West Pakistan is bordered by Iran on the west, Afghanistan on the northwest, Jammu and Kashmir on the northeast, India on the east and the Arabian Sea on the south. East Pakistan is surrounded by India, except for a short common border with Burma on the southeast, and the southern coastline on the Bay of Bengal.

Both sections of the country have tremendous importance from the standpoint of political geography, because of their contiguity to potential trouble areas in the world.

Pakistan's closest foreign relations, as a former British colony and a present member of the Commonwealth of Nations, remain naturally

¹⁸"Pakistan," The World Book Yearbook 1965, p. 453.

with the United Kingdom. In foreign relations, Pakistan generally has aligned itself with the West and, to a lesser extent, with the emerging Moslem nations. Pakistan has welcomed both Soviet and American military and economic aid, the latter particularly, because of its application to Pakistan's current development programs in industry, power generation, transportation and education.

The United States persuaded Pakistan to become a member of SEATO and CENTO as part of the alliance plan to shore up the "soft under-belly" of the Soviet periphery as a part of Dulles' plan of containment. Pakistan joined SEATO and, to a lesser extent CENTO, not so much to oppose communism, but to oppose India. When India was attacked by China, the US rushed to India's assistance with military aid, but Pakistan remained neutral yet hoping for a Chinese victory. The US has previously provided a major share of the economic aid to Pakistan.¹⁹

It is difficult to evaluate the role of China in Pakistan, since the recent development of friendly relations between these two countries is more the result of Pakistan's dichotomy with India than the natural evolution of mutual self-interest. There is an opinion that Ayub Khan is well aware of the dangers of dealing with communism and as long as he knows what he is dealing with, he is probably capable of maintaining control of the situation.²⁰

The country is very underdeveloped economically and correspondingly

¹⁹George L. Montagno, "Peaceful Coexistence: Pakistan and Red China," The Western Political Quarterly, Jun. 1965, pt. 1.

²⁰Ibid.

susceptible to political strife. Normally it would be a fruitful area for Communist subversive insurgency but because of the strong Muslim ideology, Pakistan is a poor hunting ground for communism.

AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan, located in the northwesternmost part of South Asia, is bordered on the north by the USSR, while on the south and east rises the Hindu Kush, the northwest corner of South Asia's northern wall. A friendly, stable Afghanistan constitutes a barrier to passage through the historic Khyber Pass invasion routes of the Northwest Frontier. Its geographic position and its rugged topography make Afghanistan a key to the defense of South Asia.

The unity provided by the Islamic religion, the absence of political parties, the centralization of power, the consultation of tribal chieftans, and a foreign policy of neutralism have made Afghanistan an internally stable kingdom. It has a constitutional monarchy and is a buffer state among the Middle East, the USSR and South Asia.

In spite of its landlocked geography, Afghanistan appears to be less beset by forces and trends than those facing Pakistan. With the presence of the USSR on its northern border, the historical threat is always present. The only access to the sea is through Pakistan and Iran. Thus, good relations with both these nations is of significance. This is a most underdeveloped country with a 95%-illiteracy rate, very low per capita income and a 20-30-year life expectancy. In addition, there is a lack of arable land and resources. Combined with other problems, it is apparent that this nation does not have a

base to exploit for modernization and economic advancement. The Muslim religion is a stabilizing force and, by its nature, resists the threat of communism.²¹

Afghanistan has a population of 15,200,000 people, almost all of whom are Moslems.²² Approximately 90% of the people live and are employed in agricultural areas. This country maintains an army of 64,000, complemented by a small air force. Although the Afghanistan government has had economic and social development programs, little progress has been made.²³

The United States plays a small but not insignificant role in Afghanistan through its aid programs. Much of the US aid is devoted to construction in an attempt to improve the internal transportation system, which is woefully inadequate. The US has no defense arrangements with Afghanistan and there are not likely to be any, since it does not appear to be in the interests of either party now, or in the foreseeable future.

Afghanistan is not without experience in the delicate role of the buffer between great powers and it has learned to play this role well.²⁴ In terms of military interest, it is appropriate for the United States to continue to balance Soviet military aid and economic influence and to assist in Afghanistan's development. Little, if any,

²¹354th Civil Affairs Area Hq B, op. cit., pp. 1-9.

²²"Afghanistan," The World Book Yearbook 1965, p. 206.

²³354th Civil Affairs Area Hq B, op. cit., pp. A1-5.

²⁴Patrick Seale, "Afghans' War Fears Relieved by Truce," Washington Post, 26 Sep. 1965.

benefit is to be gained by the United States' providing sizeable military aid in the form of modern weapons. Afghanistan's freedom can best be assured by US assistance in economic development as well as by Free World assurances of support, both of which will help to maintain internal stability and to counter Soviet influence.

The Soviet Union by virtue of its geography exerts the major influence on Afghanistan. The Soviet Union has trained and equipped the Afghan Army and maintains a continuing influence on it. Even so, Afghanistan can much more accurately be described as a buffer state than a satellite, and as long as this condition remains the United States should have little difficulty in this area.

Without question, the USSR could gain control over Afghanistan by sheer weight of military power. Control of Afghanistan is of no real value except as a staging area for further encroachments into South Asia or the Middle East, with the ultimate goal of access to the Arabian Sea.

It appears most likely that the Soviet threat for the foreseeable future will be based upon continued economic and military penetration.

Although there is no evidence of a Communist Party in Afghanistan this does not preclude significant Soviet influence within Afghan affairs. The influence of Soviet power is ever present in the country and affects all economic, social, and political actions. The 1200-mile common border with the USSR, massive USSR economic and military assistance, and large numbers of Russian technicians constitute omnipresence of the USSR in this country. Even the foreign policy of Afghanistan

is influenced by the USSR's placing stipulations of nonparticipation in military alliances as a condition for continued assistance. The most serious influence is developing from the large number of Afghans who are training in Russian and Soviet bloc country schools and from the continuous stream of Afghans to the USSR on Soviet-sponsored visits.

There is no evidence to indicate that Communist China plays any significant role in Afghanistan. One can speculate that the PRC prefers to concentrate its effort in this area of the world in Pakistan as a means of causing India difficulty, and thereby weakening Soviet influence in South Asia.

The stability within Afghanistan and in its relations with Pakistan have been threatened in the past by the dispute over the control of the border tribes, the Pathans. This dispute concerns the United States only because it threatens the stability in the region and conceivably could provide an outside power with an excuse to intervene, or could lead one of the disputants to request intervention in its behalf by an outside power. In the simplest terms, this dispute resulted from the creation of Pakistan in 1947 and the delimitation of its boundary with Afghanistan along the Durand Line. Neither the British nor the Afghans was successful in exercising full jurisdiction over this area called Paktunistan. As a consequence, both Pakistan and Afghanistan claim sovereignty over these nomadic people, who refuse to recognize "the artificial boundary" between the two states. This border is critical, since Afghanistan is landlocked and most of its trade with the Free World must pass through Pakistan.

At times the dispute has reached a high pitch with shooting incidents across the border. These confrontations finally led Afghanistan to break diplomatic relations with Pakistan in September 1961, thereby upsetting the stability in the area. Diplomatic relations were resumed in 1963 and hope for a complete settlement was expressed by both nations.

NEPAL

The mountain kingdom of Nepal is located on the Himalayan escarpment with a population of almost 10 million. It has an agricultural economy with over 97% of the people employed in agriculture. It has a constitutional monarchy and its army constitutes its entire military establishment of about 10,000 men.²⁵

The population is more than 50% Hindu. Most of the remaining population is Buddhist. The illiteracy rate is 95% and this nation is further handicapped by serious public health problems, poverty, and economic stagnation.²⁶

Natural barriers have tended to keep Nepal in an isolated and landlocked position. As a result, it relies principally upon India for political, military, and economic support. Industry, communications, and transportation are rudimentary. The problem of uniting this mountainous country is similar to that of the other mountain kingdoms

²⁵"Nepal," The World Book Yearbook 1965, p. 438.

²⁶354th Civil Affairs Area Hq B, op. cit., pp. N1-13.

where great distances and the lack of natural travel routes serve as natural obstacles. Each of the high Himalayan valleys is effectively separated from neighboring valleys by mountain barriers. The result is a development of a large number of isolated population groups without a strong sense of national unity.

Although Nepal is an independent sovereign nation, it is under the principal influence and watchful eye of India. A strong military tie formerly was maintained with Great Britain and Nepal's relations with Britain today remain good. Since Nepal is primarily an Indian interest, the US really has no problems there other than those related to Nepal as a buffer state for India.

Nepal's relations with the United States have been friendly and began with the signing of a friendship and commerce agreement in 1947. Since 1952, the US has provided economic aid in agricultural improvement, transportation, industrial production and road development.

Nepal established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1955 and in 1956 Nepal recognized the PRC sovereignty over Tibet. The PRC has provided substantial sums of money for economic assistance to Nepal. Boundary problems were settled between Nepal and the PRC by a treaty in 1961 and recently the PRC, by agreement with Nepal, has been involved in building a Tibet-Nepal highway. Nepal has maintained a policy of trying to get along with her powerful neighbor and so far the PRC has respected Nepal's sovereignty.²⁷

²⁷Patterson, op. cit., p. 135.

Nepal began friendly relations with the USSR with the opening of diplomatic relations in 1956. The USSR has evinced little interest in Nepal but has provided a small amount of economic aid which has included the use of Soviet technicians.

SIKKIM

Sikkim is a mountain kingdom located to the east of Nepal with a population of approximately 170,000.²⁸ It is also bordered by Tibet on the north and the east and India to the south. As with the other mountain kingdoms, progress in Sikkim is hampered by poor transportation and communications. Illiteracy is estimated at 87% and the majority of the population is engaged in agricultural activities.²⁹

The tiny Indian protectorate of Sikkim offers the least difficult route from Tibet into India by way of two manageable mountain passes. It also provides the shortest passage from Communist territory to the industrial heart of India. At one point on the Sikkim-Tibet border, the Chinese stand only 55 miles from the Indian plain, and only 350 miles from the great port of Calcutta.³⁰

As recently as 1950, India made sure that it had unchallenged military as well as political control of Sikkim. At the same time

²⁸"Thunder Out of China," Sunday Star (Washington), 19 Sep. 1965, p. B1.

²⁹Delia and Ferdinand Kuhn, "Sikkim: Short Cut to India," Washington Post, 19 Sep. 1965, p. A18.

³⁰354th Civil Affairs Area Hq B, op. cit., pp. N1-10.

Communist China occupied Tibet, just across the border. The treaty enabled the Indians to place troops in Sikkim wherever and whenever deemed necessary for Indian security. Its language could not have been more sweeping: It let India "take such measures as it considers necessary for the defense of Sikkim or the security of India."³¹

Sikkim is a protectorate of India, as provided for in the treaty of 1950, under the terms of which the Indian Government formally took over responsibility for Sikkim's foreign affairs, territorial defense and strategic communications.³² Sikkim is ruled by a Maharaja who has authority over internal affairs but whose authority is moderated by India's role as the protective power. Sikkim does not maintain a standing army, although it is developing a force to man its border outposts.³³

Although foreign relations of Sikkim are conducted solely by India, the people of Sikkim maintain as neutral an attitude as possible towards the PRC to avoid actions which might be considered provocative and thus a pretext for retaliation.³⁴

BHUTAN

The mountain kingdom of Bhutan is bounded on the north by Tibet, on the south by India and on the west by Sikkim. The population of

³¹Kuhn, op. cit., p. 18.

³²Patterson, op. cit., p. 237.

³³Kuhn, op. cit.

³⁴Patterson, op. cit., pp. 242-244.

Bhutan is approximately 750,000, almost entirely rural.³⁵ The majority of the Bhutanese are Buddhists. Bhutan is one of the most isolated nations in the world with a feudal government consisting of an absolute monarch with no political parties or courts of law.³⁶

Bhutan is the poorest of the Himalayan kingdoms with an illiteracy rate of 95%. The country's economic development has been limited by the amount of land available for cultivation, limited transportation and communication facilities, the lack of qualified technicians, modern equipment and markets. Nonetheless, Bhutan is substantially self-sustaining with almost all of its trade with India.

Indian influence is dominant in Bhutan and close ties are maintained between the two countries. The Bhutanese have maintained a policy of nonalignment and a neutral attitude towards the PRC. Since Bhutan has been claimed by the PRC to be a protectorate, Bhutan has avoided giving the PRC any cause for provocation and invasion. The PRC's clash with India in 1962 pushed Bhutan and India closer together.

The defense of Bhutan and guidance in foreign affairs is the responsibility of India through a treaty in 1949. This agreement also prohibited India from interfering in Bhutan's internal affairs. The late Indian Prime Minister Nehru warned that an attack on Bhutan would be deemed an act of war against India.

³⁵"Bhutan," The World Book Yearbook 1965, p. 239.

³⁶354th Civil Affairs Area Hq B, op. cit., pp. B1-7.

Although Bhutan has no army this does not pose a problem since her external security is guaranteed by India. Although there is a potential for insurgency within Bhutan, it is not considered likely. Even with the probable infiltration of Chinese Communists from their base in Tibet, it appears that great difficulty would be experienced in organizing an insurgency. It is highly probable that India would step in and crush any insurgency within Bhutan to assure the defense of its own borders.

With recognition that Bhutan shares with the other tiny mountain kingdoms apprehension over the Chinese threat, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the PRC will, by one means or another, ultimately seek to seize this area. The mountain kingdoms occupy the western escarpment of the Himalayan Mountains, thus constituting a most desirable objective for the PRC in providing additional security for its western borders.³⁷

The mountain kingdoms during the next five years will continue to be a target by the PRC and most likely will be subjected to border disputes and infiltration from Tibet.³⁸

CEYLON

A significant feature of South Asia is the island of Ceylon. This

³⁷Patterson, op. cit., p. 243.

³⁸B. H. Farmer, "Nine Years of Political and Economic Change in Ceylon," The World Today, Vol. 21, May 1965, pp. 189-198.

pear-shaped island is separated from the subcontinent by eighteen miles of shallow water. The position of Ceylon geographically provides an inherent problem of security, in that it is located at the focal point of commercially-and strategically-important sea and air routes.

In the area of foreign relations, the central policy of the government has been one of friendship with all nations, noninvolvement with any power bloc, and a strict course of neutralism. Independent since 1948, it has been a member of the British Commonwealth and its ties with the United Kingdom are still strong.³⁹ Ceylon is friendly toward the US and since 1956 has received some economic aid from the US. Ceylon also has received development loans from Communist China and the USSR.

The government is a parliamentary democracy like that of India.

The United States exerts little influence in Ceylon. Since 1951, the United States, as a member of the Colombo Plan, has participated in cooperative efforts to promote Ceylon's economic development. Since 1956, the US has granted the island kingdom direct economic development assistance. However, because Ceylon did not adequately compensate US companies for properties nationalized in 1963, all US aid was cut off and remains cut off at this time.⁴⁰

Problems confronting the United States in Ceylon can be viewed only in the light of Ceylon's tie to the Commonwealth and the rather

³⁹Patterson, op. cit., p. 243.

⁴⁰S. Arasaratnam, Ceylon, pp. 37-38.

preferred position occupied by Great Britain. Ceylon's defense establishment was coordinated with that of Great Britain and Ceylonese officers are trained by the British.

Ceylon has a population of 10,500,000 and is composed of two main ethnic groups which show little tendency to blend.⁴¹ About 70% of the population is Singhalese, who are Buddhist and the Tamils are Hindus and account for about 22% of the population. The religious and racial differences of these two groups are deep and has been the source of communal violence, strife and rioting.⁴²

Predominant in Ceylon are the problems of rapid population growth, anticolonialism, inflation, high taxes, a high illiteracy rate, language problems, racial problems and religious differences.⁴³

Chinese Communist and Soviet diplomatic missions were first established in Ceylon in 1957. Since that time, several other bloc countries have established missions. Relations appear to be those of normal intercourse accorded any foreign nation. Although Ceylon has signed several trade agreements with Communist countries, trade with the bloc countries amounts to less than 10% of Ceylon's total trade.⁴⁴

In recent years strong nationalist feelings have been developing in Ceylon and a by-product of this nationalism is a dislike for the old colonial powers or any foreign association which could smack of colonialism.

⁴¹"Ceylon," The World Book Yearbook 1965, p. 260.

⁴²W. Norman Brown, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, pp. 181-192.

⁴³354th Civil Affairs Area Hq B, op. cit., pp. C1-20.

⁴⁴Arasaratnam, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

CHAPTER 3

ROLES OF THE MAJOR POWERS IN SOUTH ASIA

An analysis of the forces, trends, and problems in South Asia cannot be made in isolation from the interests of the major world powers in that area. South Asia is a mixing bowl of cross-currents caused by conflicting strategies and objectives of the major world powers. Thus, it is necessary to identify the principal objectives and policies of the US, the USSR, the PRC and Great Britain toward South Asia. The identification is necessary in order to develop a further understanding of the dynamic forces at work in South Asia and to consider their economic, military, and political implications.

THE ROLE OF THE US

There are several cogent reasons why South Asia is strategically significant to the US. As the most populated, underdeveloped region in the Free World, its geographic location is a vital key in the US strategy to contain the encroachment of either Chinese or Russian communism. It is critical that South Asia remain stable, strong, and independent and thus continue to serve as a buffer against the spread of communism.¹

With the waning of British influence in South Asia in the late 1940's and the emergence of the PRC in 1949 as another major threat

¹Chester Bowles, Ambassador's Report, p. 99.

to world peace, the US strategy changed to accommodate security considerations in the major underdeveloped regions of the world along with a more consistent strategy in the Pacific.

The President of the US recently expressed great interest in South Asia primarily for three reasons:

It is the most populous non-Communist area in Asia and, with Japan, is the most strategically important. The United States already has invested \$10 billion in aid to the subcontinent, but the results have been disappointing. The differences between India and Pakistan, which should be friends, have caused a potentially calamitous war, forcing the United States to reexamine its policies in the area.²

In his State of the Union Message to the Congress on January 12, 1966, the President declared the US foreign policy to be:

The first principle is strength. . . . A second principle of policy is the effort to control, and reduce--and ultimately eliminate--modern engines of destruction. . . . A third major principle of our foreign policy is to help build those associations of nations which reflect the opportunities and necessities of the modern world. . . . A fourth enduring strand of policy has been to help improve the life of man. . . . The fifth, and most important principle of our foreign policy is support of national independence--the right of each people to govern themselves--and shape their own institutions. . . . In Africa and Asia and Latin America it is shattering the designs of those who would subdue others to their ideas or will . . . a pledge which has grown through the commitments of three American Presidents. . . . We will stay because in Asia--and around the world--are countries whose course of independence rests, in large measure, on confidence in American protection. . . . And we do not intend to abandon Asia to conquest.³

²Carroll Kilpatrick, "LBJ Reviewing US Policies in South Asia," Washington Post, 30 Nov. 1965, p. A1.

³"Text of President's State of the Union Message," Washington Post, 13 Jan. 1966, p. A6.

With high praise for the democratic institutions in free Asia, the President emphasized that India plays a pivotal role in South Asia. He made the observation that it is miraculous that India has survived and has grown stronger. Furthermore, he states that the vitality of India's economic growth would be the greatest threat to Red China. The President expressed the belief that a new order will develop in the South Asian subcontinent as a result of the recent Indo-Pakistan conflict.⁴

It has been a policy of the US to provide economic assistance to countries in South Asia to help them achieve and maintain viable growing economies. Military assistance was furnished to India and Pakistan to bolster their defense against the PRC military threat. It also has been an objective of the US and USSR to assure that the independent nations of South Asia remain free from the encroaching menace of communism. It is of prime importance to the US that the internal and external security of South Asia be maintained, so that the area is capable of resisting successfully the USSR and the PRC military, economic, and political influences.

US policy towards South Asia, in summary, is to assist these nations to maintain their independence from foreign domination, so that they can work out the economic and political systems which best satisfy their needs and desires. A basic objective of the US in this area is to assist these nations in their efforts to develop their political, economic, and social viability. Another US objective

⁴Kilpatrick, op. cit., p. 11.

is to assist in reducing tensions among these countries by promoting regional stability and mutual understanding. The long-range goal is to attain a South Asian alliance in which mutual cooperation may be realized in the political, economic, social, and military areas.

The PRC and the USSR are each trying to nullify and remove the US influence in South Asia, just as the US is attempting to minimize the PRC and USSR influence in this same area.

THE ROLE OF THE USSR

The strategy of the USSR in South Asia must, first of all, be viewed within its announced goal of enveloping the world with communism as well as of establishing itself as the "rightful" world leader. As a part of world domination, its strategy has been possible in promoting national liberation movements in the underdeveloped regions of the world (through peaceful coexistence) to include that of South Asia as a prime target.⁵

It has been the policy of the USSR to promote propaganda campaigns to portray Soviet methods as the best suitable to the political and economic advancement of the underdeveloped nations of the subcontinent of South Asia. In furtherance of this policy the USSR is providing economic and military aid to nonaligned nations of the subcontinent. It has also continued the policy of playing upon and emphasizing the inherent evils of institutions created by, and associated with, colonialism and imperialism.⁶ The promotion of national

⁵Chester Bowles, Ambassador's Report, p. 2.

⁶Barbara Ward, India and the West, p. 83.

liberation movements by the USSR has been a means of spreading Communist ideology over non-Communist states with peaceful coexistence as the desired environment.

In her continuing assertion as the most powerful Asian leader, the strategy of the USSR is to contain the PRC influence within its present borders. The USSR intent is also to prevent the PRC from taking additional territory from South Asia through force.⁷

For the present, it is apparent that the USSR and the US view with equal concern the threat of the PRC in South Asia and both are desirous of maintaining stability in this area to prevent PRC territorial gains. It must be remembered that the Soviets have realized their greatest gains through a strategy of peaceful coexistence in which there has been a minimum of East-West tension.

THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Red China is a growing threat to all free nations in its ascendancy as a world power. Marshal Lin Pao wrote:

Today the conditions are more favorable than ever before for the waging of people's wars by the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America against US imperialism and its lackeys.

Lin wrote that it is the PRC's intention to promote "wars of national liberation in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, ultimately surrounding and isolating North America and Western Europe."⁸

⁷"Big War in Asia," U. S. News & World Report, 20 Sep. 1965, p. 40.

⁸James M. Perry, "The Growing Menace of Red China," The National Observer, 27 Dec. 1965, p. 1.

Like the USSR, and differing only in strategy and tactics, the PRC has announced its intention of spreading communism throughout the world and becoming the world leader. Although the PRC is in a period of economic stagnation, she surprised the world with two nuclear detonations and is making progress toward a nuclear arsenal and a delivery system.

The PRC has emerged as a major military power. With its bellicose attitude and its apparent disdain for the effects of nuclear war, it now looks to the west and the southwest to South Asia which it claims as a historical birthright. It has been a PRC policy to pursue border imperialism and, with the largest standing army in the world, it poses an ominous threat to the borders of India. China and India have been mortal enemies historically and now vie for the position of leadership in South Asia.⁹

The Red Chinese have made it clear that Vietnam is another test of that strategy in Asia for the aggrandizement of the Communist world. The Communist Chinese Minister of Defense, Marshal Lin Pao, in his manifesto of September 3, 1965, referring to North America and Western Europe as the "cities of the world" and to Asia, Africa, and Latin America as the "rural areas," declared the "contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas." In the policy of "encirclement of the cities," Southeast Asia has the strategic significance of flanking the Indian subcontinent, facing the Philippines, and straddling the

⁹George N. Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi, p. 20.

passage from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean.¹⁰

The next Chinese explosion may be an immensely more powerful hydrogen bomb and the immediate threat posed by Red China is a crude missile tipped with an atom warhead launched from a first-class, long-range submarine. The long-range threat is that Red China will develop an intercontinental ballistics missile carrying a hydrogen warhead.¹¹

Amid the turbulence of the erupting nature of the PRC, it has been evident that she has shown an appreciation for the realities of the military power of the US. In spite of the bellicose facade of the PRC, the recognition of the vast force which the US could bring to bear in Asia has caused the Communist leadership to refrain from attacking Taiwan. The same appreciation of superior might has been shown by the unwillingness of the Red Dragon to confront the US in either South Asia or Southeast Asia.¹²

THE ROLE OF GREAT BRITAIN

The British influenced South Asia for more than two hundred years and its imprint is still felt in the subcontinent. The defense of South Asia was provided by British land and naval power. The vulnerability of South Asia to land and sea attack has not diminished with independence; conversely it has increased with the

¹⁰Perry, op. cit.

¹¹Ibid., p. 16.

¹²Ibid.

emergence of the PRC as the awesome dragon. With the diminution of British military power in Asia, it forced recognition of the urgent requirement to reconstitute an adequate defense of South Asia.¹³

India, Pakistan, and Ceylon remain as members of the British Commonwealth. The legacy of the British remains in the form of the governments, trained civil service, trained police and other residual benefits which have assisted these three countries in achieving and maintaining political stability.¹⁴

There are several facets of British strategy for South Asia which must be considered. "British India" is dead and, in its stead, the troubled relationships of the Commonwealth remain. Before World War II, for nearly two centuries, the British Raj held sway in South Asia. He was able to do so by insuring that no other great power established Indian Ocean bases, by having secure communications with its home base, controlling the gateways to the Indian Ocean, and by maintaining in India a strategic reserve for both the subcontinent defense and the Indian Ocean area.¹⁵

In the British strategy, as it was applied to the land defense of India, only Russia was considered a major threat. Tibet was a power vacuum and Afghanistan was a troublesome independent tribal kingdom which served as a buffer state. Hence, the land defense of Imperial India was crucial only in the storied lands of the Northwest

¹³Wayne A. Wilcox, India, Pakistan, and the Rise of China, pp. 1-18.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Patterson, op. cit., p. 76.

Frontier. Moreover, this British strategy kept the Northwestern and Northeastern frontier areas administered separately so that Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, NEFA, and Assam served as buffers, isolated equally from the north and from India to the south.

It is obvious that, in most respects, this British strategy is no longer totally valid. The partition of India, the emergence of a militant nuclear power in Red China, and the technology of modern warfare have invalidated this strategy. In conclusion, notwithstanding the changes since World War II, the influence of Great Britain remains in South Asia.

CHAPTER 4

CONTINGENCIES IN SOUTH ASIA 1966-70

It is now appropriate to draw from the analysis of the forces and trends of the present and determine the contingencies which are most likely to occur during the next five years and to identify those contingencies which may require some form of US involvement.

South Asia is a mosaic of seemingly insurmountable problems, human suffering and historic conflicts, which will remain for the foreseeable future. It is clear that the problems and progress in South Asia will realize little change for the next five years. South Asia will remain a potential volcano with the capability of swallowing the world in the flames of mortal combat.¹

The environments in which the contingencies will be considered are General War, Limited War and Cold War.

Within the Afro-Asian region, India stands out as the "Rock of Gibraltar" where political stability has been achieved through an effective, working democracy. In a subcontinent, where religion, linguistic conflicts and provincialism still dominate nationalism, fledgling nations are charting their destinies with a fierce desire to remain independent and free. This desire colors all relationships of these nations with the East and the West.

The population explosion and the food shortage are magnifying

¹Wayne A. Wilcox, India, Pakistan, and the Rise of China, pp. 84-85.

the economic and political problems of these countries. Significant progress in political, social, and economic areas is hampered by a shortage of resources, lack of modern technology. The customs, traditions, mores and tribal and religious differences constitute militant forces against cohesiveness and progress. The historic conflict between the Moslem and Hindu religions is a dominant force in the relationships of India and Pakistan and remains as an almost insurmountable catalyst.

The increasing external pressure of the PRC has intensified the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The pressures of its internal problems and the Kashmir dispute have forced India to look away from the international scene to reappraise problems with her immediate neighbors. The mountain kingdoms of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan are caught between the forces of Indian domination and the expansionist aims of Red China, which produce an environment of instability and increase the opportunities for subversion.

GENERAL WAR

The most likely problem area that could escalate from border tensions to general war is the situation confronting India and Red China along their borders. If a repetition of the Chinese invasion of 1962 were to occur, the Indian Army possibly could conduct delaying actions until such time as it could be logistically reinforced by the US and have her air and sea power augmented with US and other allied assistance. This situation could be triggered by a PRC

invasion and seizure of the mountain kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, or by an invasion of India itself.

This contingency could place Russia in the position of siding with India and thus on the same side as the US. The USSR may be compelled to assist India to prevent the PRC from swallowing South Asia and increasing its threat to the security of the USSR.

The continuing tension between India and Pakistan is not likely to escalate into anything more than short outbreaks of fighting. The open warfare in September 1965 forced both the US and USSR into adopting neutral positions with regard to the dispute, and certainly would be likely to do so again if the fighting were to erupt anew.

An invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR would pose a difficult situation for the US, but its likelihood is considered remote during the studied period.

LIMITED WAR

The situations which could escalate to limited war environments include the border disputes between India and the PRC, the dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the Kashmir dispute. All three of these trouble areas possess the potential for escalation into open limited war.

It is most likely that the area between Pakistan and Afghanistan will remain a problem area, but will not escalate to any degree and, particularly, into a limited war situation.

The Kashmir dispute will remain a volcanic potential. The mortal

hate and distrust that each country holds for the other has not abated, although their recent conflict has ceased with the promise to consider further settlement at a conference table. If this war is renewed at some future date, it is most likely that the US and the USSR again would take neutral positions with reference to India and Pakistan and seek to bring all means available to bear to terminate the conflict. The PRC again could take the opportunity of advancing on India to bring humiliation to India, as well as to assist Pakistan. This move by Red China would constitute a direct confrontation to the US and the USSR and could lead into a general war situation.

The border disputes between India and the PRC most likely will continue at that level. It is not likely that any limited war situations would develop between the two which would not result in escalation to a general war situation.

COLD WAR

The cold war environment is the one in which South Asia most likely will find itself for the next five years.

The probable future of South Asia for the next five year period is a mosaic of the present. The PRC undoubtedly will continue its policy of border imperialism and will be the source of periodic and intentional flare-ups between the Red Chinese and the Indians. The Kashmir dispute will remain the most volatile situation without solution for the next five years. This much is clear: The deep-rooted

bases for the religious strife, political and economic rivalry, mutual fear, anticolonialist attitudes and the goals of the major world powers will chart the destiny of South Asia for the next five years.

The involvement of the US in South Asia for the next five years appears to be a pattern of the present, i.e., providing military and economic aid in the cold war environment.

The character of South Asia indicates reasonable conditions of stability in view of the great changes occurring in the states of South Asia. Insurgency is a threat and where it is a threat, the government in power would appear to be capable of coping with the problem. In India there are recent examples of two forms of insurgency--nationalistic-inspired and Communist-inspired.

Under the British, the Northeast Frontier states were administered loosely and separately from continental India. The Naga tribe of the Northeast Frontier Agency was in this group. Conflicts arose with the creation of an independent India and the consequent efforts of a central government to impose its rule. Nagaland became the locale of riot and unrest as the tribesman tried to retain his identity and independence. Here, political compromise provided a solution by the creation of a new Indian State of Nagaland.²

Despite the overwhelming majority of the Congress party in the Indian Government, the Communist party has controlled the government

²Warren Unna, "Indians and Nagas Seek to Reach Terms Today," Washington Post, 18 Feb. 1966, p. A15.

in the State of Kerala and has the second largest number of seats in the Indian legislature. Since the Chinese invasion of 1962, the Indian Government has been most sensitive to Communist party activities. The Congress party is in strong control of the Indian Government and appears both willing and able to cope with this threat. Other comparable threats of insurgency exist in South Asia, but, in each instance, the government in power appears able to solve the problem.

It is anticipated that the USSR and Communist China will continue their vigorous competition against each other and against the West in an attempt ultimately to gain domination over the entire subcontinent. It is visualized that the Soviet Union will gain subversive inroads in the subcontinent through their aid programs to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. On the other hand, Red China will attempt to infiltrate and subvert the northern frontier areas, and possibly Ceylon, in an initial step to gain domination over South Asia.

The possibility of an active, large scale insurgency occurring in India in the next five years is not likely, even though India has many of the contributing factors which normally lay the foundation for insurgency. The Government of India amply has demonstrated in the State of Kerala that it will ruthlessly stamp out any such threats. Although there are local pockets of communism in India, the evidence to date indicates that the Government of India will not tolerate an increase of an internal Communist threat.

Although the other nations of South Asia also possess the

essential ingredients for insurgency, it is possible but not likely that one will occur during the studied period.

CHAPTER 5

CIVIL AFFAIRS MISSIONS AND ROLES

There is no evidence at the present time, nor are there indications, that a general war will occur in South Asia for the next five years. This eliminates the requirements in a general war environment for the civil affairs missions, such as command support, area support, military government, and civil defense.

It is recognized that a limited war in South Asia, although remote, is possible during the next five years. A renewal of the India-Pakistan war over Kashmir would place the US in the role again as that of a committed, but impartial observer, using the UN as the arbitrator. It is believed that the PRC would not risk the escalation of a border dispute into limited war with India so as to prevent a confrontation with the US. A limited war between Pakistan and Afghanistan would place the US in the same position as in the Kashmir dispute. Even if one of these contingencies were to occur, the support provided by the US would be primarily logistical, coupled with air and possibly naval support. There would be no requirement for US ground forces and consequently, no requirement for civil affairs missions, such as command support, area support, military government, or civil defense.

In spite of the improbability of a general or limited war, it is well to consider civil affairs missions and roles in the event one of those contingencies occurred. It is significant that, in either

a general or limited war, US Army ground forces probably would not be required or requested because of the vast manpower resources available. This fact would eliminate the civil affairs missions of command support and area support. Due to the capability of either India or Pakistan to reconstitute its respective governments in the face of both civil defense and military government requirements, the US Army civil affairs missions of civil defense and military government are thereby eliminated.

Since cold war is interpreted as involving the use of political, economic, social, technological and military means short of armed conflict between armed forces, this region requires continuous contingency planning insofar as civil affairs aspects are concerned. This is to assure that discernible contingencies are identified and planned for in sufficient time for US forces to react. To this end, a civil affairs plan must be prepared to establish requirements for the present in South Asia, as well as to project requirements for the next five to ten years. Civic action plans must be annexes to the civil affairs plans for South Asia. Such civil affairs plans also will provide the necessary elements to be included in military assistance planning to the nations of South Asia in countering insurgency.

Present forces and trends in South Asia probably will not change appreciably in the next five years. From this environment one can deduce two key roles for civil affairs planning and study--civic action and countering insurgency.

Despite unrest in India and potential insurgency, possibilities at present for a civic action program involving US forces are extremely limited. Although there is a great and continuing need for civic improvement at the community and higher level, India's heritage would rule against the employment of its own or foreign military personnel for such purposes, except under the most unusual circumstances. Careful examination must be given to circumstances of insurgency which could impell India to depart from traditional patterns of development.

Nevertheless, it is in the area of civic action that the greatest opportunity and possibility exists for a civil affairs role during the next five years.¹ There are several reasons for this conclusion. The civic action program in Pakistan has been very successful. The nature of the social and economic problems in India are similar to those of Pakistan, which readily lend themselves to civic action programs. The size of India's armed forces, with the resultant drain on their economy dictate that their utilization be broadened in peacetime to assist in nation building. Unlike many underdeveloped countries, India has the essential elements in government to remain stable, and it is clear that India has the capability of managing its own development, while other nations assist.

As a result, a civil affairs requirement for a civic action plan for South Asia is definitely generated. In summary, there does not

¹Harry F. Walterhouse, A Time to Build, pp. 4-8.

appear to be any discernible role for US Army civil affairs in military government, command support, area support or civil defense in South Asia 1966-70. There does appear an unlimited potential for military civic action throughout India and its neighboring countries. Another role for civil affairs is to provide short- and long-range contingency planning which may identify contingencies similar to the Dominican Republic and Lebanese situations.

This paper has accomplished a strategic appraisal for South Asia for the time frame 1966-70. It does provide a realistic operational model for any civil affairs unit commander assigned an area or country anywhere in the world. The step by step analysis to identify contingencies, possible US Army involvement and thus, US Army civil affairs missions and roles has been accomplished.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Ivan A. Reitz".

IVAN A. REITZ
Col, Civil Affairs

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Arasaratnam, S. Ceylon. Edgewood Cliff, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. (DS489.5 A7)
2. "Big War in Asia." U. S. News & World Report, Washington: 20 Sep. 1965, pp. 37-41.
3. Bowles, Chester. Ambassador's Report. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. (DS480.84 B6)
4. Brecher, Michael. India's Foreign Policy. Institute of Pacific Relations, Feb. 1958.
5. Brown, W. Norman. India, Pakistan, Ceylon. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960. (DS407 B7)
6. Callard, Keith B. Pakistan's Foreign Policy. Institute of Pacific Relations, Feb. 1958.
7. Capshaw, D. P. The Ambitions and Realities of Nonaligned India. Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: U. S. Army War College, 3 May 1965. (AWC IS-64/65)
8. Chakravarti, P. C. India's China Policy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962. (JX1571 27C61 C45)
9. Chookolingo, Frank C. India: The Inside Story; Past, Present and Future. New York: Exposition Press, 1958. (DS414 C45)
10. Dougherty, W. E., and Andrews, M. Operations Research Office. A Review of US Historical Experience with Civil Affairs 1776-1954. Technical Paper ORO-TP-29. The Johns Hopkins University, May 1961. (ORO TP-29)
11. Farmer, B. H. "Nine Years of Political and Economic Change in Ceylon." The World Today, Vol. 21, 21 May 1965.
12. Fodor, Eugene, and Curtis, William. Fodor's Guide to India. New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1963. (D406 F6)
13. Grace, Peter. "Peacemaker Role Intrigues Kremlin." New York: New York Times, 15 Jan. 1966, p. E3.
14. Halloran, Richard. "Expelling US Held Main Aim of Peking." Washington: Washington Post, 21 Feb. 1966, p. A26.
15. Harrison, Selig S. "Peking Threat Confronts US with India Policy Dilemma." Washington: Washington Post, 19 Sep. 1965, p. A18.

16. Harrison, Selig S. "Shastri Insists India Will Hold Kashmir." Washington: Washington Post, 23 Nov. 1965, p. A24.
17. Higgins, Cerald J. Operations Research Office. Civil Affairs in Future Armed Conflicts. Special Study Staff Paper ORO-SP-146. The Johns Hopkins University, Jul. 1960. (ORO SP-146)
18. Howard, Carl D. "A New Asian War When a Feud Flares." Washington: The National Observer, 13 Sep. 1965, pp. 1, 24.
19. Howard, Carl D. "The Jabbing Goes on Between India and China." Washington: The National Observer, 27 Sep. 1965, p. 3.
20. India Council of World Affairs. Defence and Security in the Indian Ocean Area. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1958. (DS448. I5)
21. Jeffries, Sir Charles. Ceylon; The Path to Independence. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. Publisher, 1963. (DS489.5 J4)
22. Keene, Leonard L. The Strategic Importance of India to the Free World. Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: U. S. Army War College, 3 May 1965. (AWC IS-64/65)
23. Kilpatrick, Carroll. "LBJ Reviewing US Policies in South Asia." Washington: Washington Post, 30 Nov. 1965, p. A-1.
24. King, James E., Jr. Operations Research Office. Civil Affairs: The Future Prospects of a Military Responsibility. The Johns Hopkins University, Jun. 1958. (ORO SP-55)
25. Kuhn, Delia and Ferdinand. "China Held Sure to Avoid Sikkim Short Cut to India." Washington: Washington Post, 19 Sep. 1965, p. A-18.
26. McDonough, Joseph C. United States Military Stretegy in South Asia. Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: U. S. Army War College, 3 May 1965. (AWC IS-64/65)
27. Marxen, Edward H. Afghanistan: Emphasis on the Future. Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: U. S. Army War College, 3 May 1965. (AWC IS-64/65)
28. Mire, Evarice C. India Versus Pakistan: The Roots of Dispute and Possible Courses of US Action. Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: U. S. Army War College, 3 May 1965. (AWC IS-64/65)
29. Montagno, George L. "Peaceful Coexistence: Pakistan and Red China." The Western Quarterly, Jun. 1965, Pt. 1.

30. Nehru, B. K. Speaking of India. Washington: Information Service of India, 1963. (DS480.84 N4)
31. "New Government Outlines Pakistan's Foreign Policy." Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Washington: Embassy of Pakistan. (JX1571.5 P14 A3)
32. Operations Research Office. The Developing Role of the Army in Civil Affairs. Technical Memorandum ORO-T-398. The Johns Hopkins University, Jun. 1961. (ORO-T-398)
33. Pakeman, Sidney A. Ceylon. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1964. (DS489.5 P3)
34. Patterson, George N. Peking Versus Delhi. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. (NX1571 Z7C61 P3)
35. Perry, James M. "The Growing Menace of Red China." Washington: The National Observer, 27 Dec. 1965, pp. 1, 14.
36. "Proposed Mutual Defense and Development Programs: GY 1965." Summary Presentation to the Congress. Washington: US GPO, Apr. 1964. (HC 60 U7)
37. Rowan, Carl T. "India's Famine and the Challenge to US." Sunday Star (Washington), 20 Feb. 1966, p. C-4.
38. Seale, Patrick. "Afghan's War Fears Relieved by Truce." Washington: Washington Post, 26 Sep. 1965.
39. "Senseless War on the Subcontinent." Newsweek, 20 Sep. 1965, pp. 33-37.
40. Sorensen, Theodore C. "Red China and India." Washington: Sunday Star (Washington), 19 Sep. 1965, p. A-10.
41. Spate, O. H. K. India and Pakistan. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1954. (GB301 S6)
42. Sulzberger, C. L. "Foreign Affairs--Our Enemy and Ally, Russia." New York Times, 15 Jan. 1966.
43. "Text of President's State of Union Message to Congress." Washington Post, 13 Jan. 1966, p. A-6.
44. The World Book Encyclopedia. Vol. 9.
45. The World Book Encyclopedia Yearbook 1965.
46. "Thunder Out of China." Washington: Evening Star (Washington), 19 Sep. 1965, p. B-1.

47. Toffler, Alan R. India's Foreign Policy--The Future of Non-alignment. Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: U. S. Army War College, 3 May 1965. (AWC IS-64/65)
48. Topping, Seymour. "Moseow to Peking: We're Asians Too." New York: New York Times, 15 Jan. 1966, p. E-3.
49. Unna, Warren. "Drought-Seared India Near Famine." Washington: Washington Post, 5 Dec. 1965, p. E-1.
50. Unna, Warren. "Indians and Nagas Seek to Reach Terms Today." Washington: Washington Post, 18 Feb. 1966, p. A-15.
51. US Agency for International Development and US Dept of Defense. Proposed Mutual Defense and Development Programs FY 1965. Washington: US GPO, Apr. 1964. (HC60 U7)
52. US Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Comingling of United States and Communist Foreign Aid. 87th Congress, Second Session. Washington: US GPO, 1962. (HC 443 C17U5)
53. US Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Foreign Policy, Compilation of Studies. 85th Congress. Washington: US GPO, 1960. (JX1416 A49)
54. US Dept of Defense. "India and Pakistan: Crisis in South Asia." For Commanders - This Changing World. Washington: US GPO, Vol. 5, No. 7, 1 Oct. 1965, pp. 1-4.
55. US Dept of the Army. Field Manual 41-10: Civil Affairs Operations. Washington: May 1964.
56. US Dept of the Army. "India and Pakistan: Crises in South Asia." For Commanders - This Changing World, Vol. 5, 1 Oct. 1965.
57. US Dept of the Army. Pamphlet No. 550-45: US Army Handbook for Nepal (with Sikkim and Bhutan), May 1964.
58. US Dept of the Army. Pamphlet No. 550-21: US Army Area Handbook for India, Jul. 1964.
59. US Dept of the Army. 354th Civil Affairs Area Hq. B. Draft Area Study - South Asia. Washington: (Unpublished). Jul. 1965.
60. Walterhouse, Harry F. A Time to Build Columbia. South Carolina: The R. L. Bryan Company, 1964. (JA12 W3)

61. Ward, Barbara. India and the West. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1961. (HC435 W341)
62. Watkins, Mary Bradley. Afghanistan, Land in Transition. Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1963. (DS352 W3)
63. Weiner, Myron. The Politics of Scarcity. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962. (DS480.84 W4)
64. Weston, Christine. Afghanistan. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962. (DS352 W4)
65. "What Kashmir Means to the US." U. S. News & World Report, Washington: 20 Sep. 1966.
66. Wilcox, Wayne A. India, Pakistan, and the Rise of China. New York: Walker and Company, 1964. (DS335 W48)